We study the e¤ects of …scal policy on the macroeconomy using a liquidity-constrained New Keynesian model in which government bonds are liquid and private …nancial assets are only partially liquid. We …nd that the …scal multipliers in this economic environment are large enough for …scal policy to be highly e¤ective. In this model, a bond-…nanced …scal expansion can stimulate output since higher public borrowing improves liquidity by increasing the proportion of liquid assets in private sector wealth.
Introduction
Over the last decade, in many if not all developed countries, monetary policy has been the main instrument for managing the growth of aggregate demand and in ‡ationary pressure. The chief monetary policy tool has been shortterm interest rates. The response to the recent …nancial crisis has typically been lowering the nominal interest rate to its zero lower bound. As monetary policy loses its power at the zero lower bound, the conventional option of cutting interest rates is no longer available. This raises the question of whether …scal policy is e¤ective in mitigating the e¤ects of the crisis.
Answering this question requires a model that can capture the key aspects of the crisis. As many noted, the realisation at the onset of the crisis that many private …nancial assets were of lower quality and therefore accompanied by higher default risks than previously assumed led to a ‡ight to liquid assets. At the height of the crisis, the markets for private …nan- 2 We introduce a role for government spending in the DEFK model. In our experiments, we consider two di¤erent kinds of …scal expansion: a government spending rise and a tax cut. In the former case, the government buys more goods and services from …rms and therefore stimulates aggregate demand. In the latter case, the government carries out a lump-sum tax cut which in practice resembles a lump-sum transfer to households. In both cases, we assume that the …scal expansion is …nanced mainly by bonds -the government issues bonds to households to be repaid by tax rises at a later date.
In our study, we consider two scenarios. In the …rst scenario, we look at the government spending multiplier using the version of the DEFK model in normal times (i.e., without liquidity shocks) when the zero lower bound on the nominal interest rate does not bind. We …nd that the size of the multiplier is much larger than that suggested by a standard DSGE model without …nancial frictions. The cumulative government spending multiplier obtained using the DEFK model is 1.6, while the one in the standard model is 0.55. The intuition for this result is as follows. In both models, an increase in government spending leads to higher future tax burdens and rises in the real interest rate. Both of these factors cause households to postpone consumption and increase their government bond holdings. In the standard model, investment falls since the higher real interest rate on bonds increases the opportunity cost of investing in physical capital. The government spending multiplier is thus smaller than 1. In the DEFK model, the multiplier is large because, unlike in the standard model, a bond-…nanced government spending expansion improves liquidity by increasing the proportion of liquid assets in households'wealth, which in turn allows liquidity constrained entrepreneurs to increase investment. Increased economic activity then increases private consumption, leading to a large multiplier.
In the second scenario, we look at the government spending multiplier in a liquidity crisis caused by a fall in the resaleability of private equity, in which case the zero lower bound on the nominal interest rate becomes binding. 3 We …nd that, in the DEFK model and in the standard model, the government spending multiplier is much larger in a liquidity crisis than in normal times. Moreover, we …nd that in the crisis scenario the multiplier in the DEFK model is still larger than that in the standard model. The government spending multiplier suggested by the DEFK model is larger than 2 in crisis times. At the zero lower bound, an increase in government spending creates in ‡ationary pressures which decrease the real interest rate and stimulate consumption. In the DEFK model, the stimulative e¤ect of …scal policy is even larger because the multiplier e¤ect applies to both consumption and investment. Holding the persistence of government spending 3 Erceg and Linde (2012) criticise the assumption of an exogenous zero-bound condition in the study of the …scal multiplier. They point out that, as an increase in government expenditure may help push the economy out of a liquidity trap, the multiplier will be smaller if the zero-bound condition is endogenous. Mertens and Ravn (2010) warn that the value of the multiplier is sensitive to the type of shock that drives the economy into a liquidity trap. To address these issues, we examine the …scal multipliers using the DEFK model, in which the liquidity trap is endogenously caused by a …nancial crisis.
constant, we show that the value of the government spending multiplier in the standard model tends to decrease as the crisis prolongs, whereas in the DEFK model it increases. Under the crisis scenario, we also examine the e¤ects of the …scal interventions in the US under the 2009 American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA). Our …ndings suggest that the …scal interventions may have prevented a deeper recession.
We then study the tax multiplier in both the normal-times and the crisis scenarios. Our results obtained with the DEFK model show that the tax multiplier is smaller than the government spending multiplier. A cut in lump-sum taxes reduces the revenue of the government, causing it to increase bond issues. This improves the private sector's liquidity and leads to increases in investment, consumption and output. The tax cut is less e¤ective than government spending in stimulating output since it does not directly generate aggregate demand. This result suggests that both an increase in aggregate demand and an improvement in liquidity are important in stimulating economic activity.
Finally, we test the sensitivity of the spending and the tax multipliers to the steady-state debt-to-output ratio. Our results suggest that …scal policy is more e¤ective in stimulating output when the initial debt-to-GDP ratio is low. The policy implication is that containing the debt level during normal times would allow governments to achieve more e¤ective results of …scal stimulus in times of crisis, when such results are most needed. Before describing the model, let us brie ‡y review the literature on this topic. 4 (2011)). The CEE/SW model assumes frictionless …nancial markets and therefore cannot provide a detailed account of the 4 The majority of empirical research in this area seems to suggest that …scal policy is not e¤ective and that an increase in government spending does not have a signi…cant e¤ect on the economy (see, for example, Hall (2009), Ramey (2011b) and references therein). The government spending multiplier is typically estimated to lie between 0.6 and 1.2. However, some recent empirical studies show that the …scal multiplier is much larger during a recession (see, for example, Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2012) use a Borrower-Saver model in which some agents' ability to optimise intertemporally is limited by the borrowing constraints that they face. Both studies suggest that …scal policy is more e¤ective in stimulating output in the presence of borrowing constraints, although the value of the spending/tax multiplier depends heavily on the share of debt-constrained borrowers in the economy. Carrillo and Poilly (2013) and Fernandez-Villaverde (2010), on the other hand, use models that accommodate the form of liquidity frictions suggested by Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1999) ("BGG"), in which …rms' ability to borrow is determined by the market value of their net worth.
Fernandez-Villaverde (2010) …nds that the value of the spending multiplier is around one upon impact and falls quickly thereafter. His multiplier is larger than that suggested by standard models but smaller than ours. 5 Carrillo and Poilly (2013) …nd that …nancial frictions have a greater contribution to the value of the multiplier in a liquidity trap than in normal times. Their cumulative multiplier in the liquidity-trap case is 3.7, 6 which is almost twice as large as ours. Our paper di¤ers from previous studies in the way that …nancial frictions are introduced. While the Borrower-Saver model and the BGG model focus on borrowing constraints, the DEFK model accounts for both borrowing constraints and asset resaleability constraints. 7 To generate a liquidity trap, Carrillo and Poilly (2013) assume that the capital returns perceived by entrepreneurs are a¤ected by a risk-premium shock similar to 5 As shown later in our results, although our post-shock impact multiplier in normal times is smaller than 1, it increases gradually over time. As a result, the cumulative multiplier we obtain (1.6) is substantially larger than 1. 6 See Table 1 in the online appendix that can be found as supplementary material at http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.red.2013.01.004. 7 Although the DEFK model focuses mainly on resaleability constraints, borrowing constraints also play a signi…cant role in generating large …scal multipliers. If there are no borrowing constraints, as discussed in KM, new investment could be wholly …nanced by issuing new equity. In that case, shocks to resaleability would have negligible impacts. 
The Model with Liquidity Frictions
This section describes the special features of our model. The model that we use is proposed by DEFK, in which households are liquidity constrained and face shocks that tighten their liquidity. Government expenditure is absent in the original DEFK model. We introduce a role for government spending in the model for our study of the …scal multiplier.
Households
The economy consists of a continuum of identical households. Each household consists of a continuum of members j 2 [0; 1]. In each period, members have an i.i.d. opportunity { to invest in capital. Household members (j 2 [0; {)) who receive the opportunity to invest are "entrepreneurs", whereas those who do not (j 2 [{; 1]) are "workers". Entrepreneurs invest and do not work. Workers work to earn labour income. Each household's assets are divided equally among its own members at the beginning of each period. After members …nd out whether they are entrepreneurs or workers, households cannot reallocate their assets. If any household member needs extra funds, they need to obtain them from external sources. At the end of each period, household members return all their assets plus any income they earn during the period to the household. 8 The representative household's utility depends on the aggregate consumption C t R 1 0 C t (j) dj as consumption goods are jointly utilised by its members. Each member seeks to maximise the utility of the household as a whole, which is given by:
where is the discount factor, is the coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion, and is the inverse Frisch elasticity of labour supply. The intertemporal budget constraint is: 9
where t Pt P t 1 is the gross in ‡ation rate at t and W t (j) is the nominal wage earned by type-j workers. Entrepreneurs and workers face di¤erent problems as explained below.
Entrepreneurs
In the steady state and the post-shock equilibria, the market price of equity q t is always greater than the investment cost of new capital p I t . Hence, the return on new capital is strictly greater than those on equity and on government bonds. Entrepreneurs are rational and would invest all their available resources in new capital. To spare more funds for investment, entrepreneurs do not spend on consumption goods, i.e., C t (j) = 0 for j 2 [0; {). They would also sell all their bond holdings so that L t (j) = 0 for j 2 [0; {). 10 There are, however, borrowing and resaleability constraints if entrepreneurs want to obtain funds through equity: Entrepreneurs can borrow by issuing equity of only up to 2 (0; 1) fraction of their new investment. Also, in each period, entrepreneurs can sell only up to t 2 (0; 1) fraction of their net equity holdings. Since borrowing and resaleability constraints are both binding, entrepreneurs' net equity evolves according to
…rst order conditions for C t (j), L t (j) and N t (j) with the intertemporal budget constraint (2) gives the aggregate investment function:
Workers
Workers' consumption and saving decisions can be derived by considering the household as a whole. Workers choose C t , L t and N t to maximise the household's utility (1), subject to the intertemporal budget constraint (2) and the investment decision of entrepreneurs (3). The …rst-order conditions give the respective Euler equations for bonds and equity: 
Government Policies
The government's budget constraint is:
In addition, the …scal rule requires that:
where the policy parameter > 0. Variables without the time subscript represent steady-state values. The value of is low to re ‡ect that the adjustment on taxes is slow compared to bond issue, so the government has to obtain funds for …scal expansion mainly by issuing bonds. t is an exogenous tax shock.
The central bank adopts a generalised Taylor rule similar to the one in SW (2007):
where R is the interest rate smoothing parameter, > 1; and Y and Y are both between zero and one. The zero lower bound on the nominal interest rate requires that R t cannot be lower than 1. 11 The gross real interest rate is obtained by r t = Rt Et( t+1 ) .
Equilibrium and Solution Strategy
Other assumptions in the model are standard New Keynesian. In this paper, we study the policy multipliers for a government spending expansion and a lump-sum tax cut respectively. A government spending shock is measured as
We assume an AR(1) evolution of government spending:
where G is the persistence parameter. Similarly, a tax shock t to the …scal rule (7) is also measured as a percentage of GDP and evolves according to an AR(1) process: t = t 1 + e t . Using the DEFK model, we study the …scal multiplier under two scenarios:
in normal times and in times of a liquidity crisis. We de…ne normal times as the times when the …scal policy shock is the only source of disturbances, whereas crisis times are when the economy is also struck by a liquidity shock.
A liquidity shock refers to a sudden drop of private assets'resaleability, expressed by a fall in the value of the resaleability parameter t from steady state. Evolution of b t t follows b t = e t < 0. In a liquidity crisis, large falls in output and in ‡ation push the nominal interest rate to its zero lower bound.
We retain the nonlinear nature of the model in our simulation experiments. Since the competitive equilibria achieved following a liquidity shock can stay far away from the steady state for a long time, applying loglinearisation may lead to inaccurate results. Given the fact that, as it was under the 2009 American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA), the path of government spending is often expected for some periods after its announcement, we carry out deterministic simulations using Dynare based on the assumption of perfect foresight. Under this assumption, agents have perfect foresight on the paths of shocks and expect with certainty that no subsequent shock will follow in the future. In a deterministic simulation, Dynare generates the responses of variables from the realisation of a shock in the …rst period until the economy goes back to the steady state. To achieve this, Dynare solves a nonlinear system of simultaneous equations for every period by adopting a Newton-type method. We refer interested readers to Adjemian et al. (2011) for a detailed description of the algorithm.
Unlike DEFK, who assume that the resaleability parameter b t follows a two-state Markov process, we assume that b t stays below zero after a liquidity shock for a deterministic number of periods. In view of the …ndings by Carlstrom, Fuerst and Paustian (2012), our main conclusion that the …scal multipliers are large in the DEFK model would not be a¤ected if we assume a stochastic exit for the liquidity-trap crisis rather than a deterministic exit. Carlstrom et al. (2012) …nd that the …scal multiplier can be unboundedly large in a liquidity-trap crisis with a stochastic exit because when the end date of the crisis is uncertain, the value of the …scal multiplier can be in‡ated by the low probability event of the pegged interest rate lasting for a very long time. Although in reality it is hard to assess people's expectations on the probability distributions of shocks, our deterministic-exit assumption can nevertheless provide a lower-bound estimate of the value of the …scal multiplier under a certain expected duration of the crisis. If we instead assume a stochastic exit, the …scal multipliers we obtain would have been even larger.
Calibration
Most of the calibration in this paper is drawn from the estimations of SW, except for the parameters related to liquidity frictions, which largely follow DEFK. The calibrated values are summarised in Table 1 Other parameters related to capital investment are {, , and . Consistent with DEFK, we calibrate the i.i.d. opportunity to invest in each quarter ({) to 0.05, which equals to a 19% (= 1 (1 0:05) 4 ) chance to invest in one year. 12 The capital adjustment cost parameter ( ) is set to 1 2 As noted by DEFK, 5% is a conservative estimate of the investment opportunity in 
How Large Is the Government Spending Multiplier?
In the literature, studies of the …scal multiplier usually focus on the impact multiplier which is de…ned as dYt dGt , where dY t and dG t are the respective di¤erences of output and government spending from their steady state at period t. As noted by Woodford (2011) , this way of calculating the multiplier requires the output rise to follow the same shape of time path as that the literature. We thus carried out numerical experiments to increase the value of { and found that even a slight increase of { to 5.5% would cause the condition that qt > p I t not to hold. Since such condition is crucial in deriving the …rst order conditions of entrepreneurs, we stick with DEFK's calibration to set { at 5%. of the government spending rise for the multiplier to be meaningful. We recognise in our simulations that the e¤ects of …scal stimulus on GDP are often delayed, so the time paths of the two can di¤er from each other substantially. For this reason, we instead focus on the cumulative multiplier, de…ned as
If it is greater than one, it implies that any change in government spending has a spillover e¤ect on GDP. We examine the value of the multiplier in normal times and in times of crisis. We de…ne "normal times"as the cases where the economy is in the vicinity of the steady state.
Liquidity frictions are present in the DEFK model even in normal times due to the borrowing and the resaleability constraints facing households.
As noted in the previous section, we follow DEFK in our calibration of the liquidity-constraint parameters, and , at steady state. Since DEFK calibrate these parameters using US data for the period from 1952 to 2008, the amount of liquidity in our model in normal times re ‡ects the average condition for that period. 13 In the DEFK model, a liquidity crisis occurs when the resaleability constraint on equity tightens, simulating the condition when the …nancial crisis started in 2008.
The Multiplier in Normal Times
We use the DEFK model to calculate the government spending multiplier in normal times by giving the steady state a positive government spending shock of 1% of GDP. Government spending follows an AR(1) process with a persistence of 0.8. We obtain the cumulative multiplier on output at 1.61.
How does this result compare with that obtained using a standard New Keynesian DSGE model? We carry out a control experiment by stripping all liquidity-constraint features from the DEFK model. 14 With the same gov- 1 3 In a speech in 2005, Alan Greenspan suggested that access to credit had become unproblematic to the vast majority of households. Speci…cally, he noted that "[w]ith these advances in technology, lenders have taken advantage of credit-scoring models and other techniques for e¢ ciently extending credit to a broader spectrum of consumers...". The period that Greenspan was referring to is the time just before 2005, when the subprime bubble was forming. Arguably, that should not represent the liquidity in "normal times". 1 4 In this standard DSGE model, investment opportunities are not scarce. Investing in ernment spending shock, the model without liquidity frictions (henceforth the "standard model") predicts the cumulative multiplier on output to be 0.55. In Rows 2 -4 of Table 2 , we summarise the cumulative government spending multipliers obtained using the two models in the normal-times scenario. Our impulse response analysis suggests that government spending expansion has positive spillover e¤ects on consumption and investment in the DEFK model. We also compute the cumulative multipliers on consumption and investment in both the standard and the DEFK models. These multipliers measure the expected cumulative increases in consumption and investment respectively, given a one-dollar cumulative increase in government capital is not more pro…table than holding other assets. The investment function hence reverts to a standard Euler equation. We use the calibration shown in Table 1 with the exception of , which is adjusted to 0.9943 to keep the steady-state interest rate in line with that in the DEFK model. 1 5 Upon impact, investment decreases slightly because an increase in bond holdings in period t only has an e¤ect on investment in t + 1. spending. As shown in Table 2 tend to focus on samples in which much of the spending was …nanced by distortionary tax increases, whereas in our paper, we focus on debt-…nanced expansion.
Standard model DEFK model
To understand why the DEFK model generates di¤erent results to the standard model's, let us …rst consider the mechanism at work in the standard model. In the standard model, while an increase in government spending creates aggregate demand which increases in output, it also creates in ‡a-tion pressures, causing the central bank to tighten monetary policy. Both investment and consumption are crowded out by the rising interest rate.
In addition, forward-looking households anticipate future tax increases and react by reducing consumption. The negative wealth e¤ect induces workers to work more, leading to increases in labour supply. However, the overall increase in output is smaller than the increase in government spending.
The mechanism at work in the DEFK model is di¤erent from the one in the standard model in that an increase in government spending in the DEFK model also a¤ects liquidity through an increase in the supply of government bonds, which we de…ne as the "liquidity e¤ect" of …scal expansion. In the DEFK model, households are liquidity constrained in a way that entrepreneurs want to obtain funds to make pro…table investments but cannot. The government, on the other hand, is not bound by liquidity constraints. As the government issues a bond to a household to be repaid by higher taxes on the household in the future, the government is in e¤ect borrowing on behalf of the household at the risk-free interest rate. For this reason, a …scal expansion …nanced mainly by bonds generates extra liquidity to the households.
The improvement in liquidity is re ‡ected in the reduction in the spread between liquid and illiquid assets, de…ned as E t
. Our model shows that the quarterly spread reduces by 3 basis points following the government spending expansion.
We carry out an experiment to isolate the liquidity e¤ect of the government spending rise in the DEFK model. We consider the hypothetical case where government spending does not use output, so that aggregate demand is immune to any changes in government spending. Given the same amount of government bonds issued as in the baseline case, we obtain the cumulative multipliers solely due to the liquidity e¤ect, which are reported in Rows 5 -7 of Table 2 . Both the consumption and the investment multipliers due to the liquidity e¤ect are positive, suggesting that consumption and investment are crowded in by an improvement in liquidity. The intuition is as follows:
A government spending expansion in the DEFK model is …nanced mainly by public debt since tax adjustments are slow. As the government increases their spending, higher real interest rates and future tax burdens cause households to increase their bond holdings, thus improving households'liquidity since government bonds are liquid. When an attractive investment opportunity arrives, rational entrepreneurs sell all their liquid assets to obtain funds to invest in new capital. Investment therefore increases following the government spending rise. 16 The increase in investment has a knock-on e¤ect on consumption. The fact that consumption becomes positive later than investment reinforces this insight (see Figure 1) . The intuition for the positive multiplier on consumption is as follows. Due to intertemporal substitution e¤ects, rising interest rates cause workers to respond to the government spending shock initially by reducing consumption. As we assume that government spending follows an AR(1) process, the increase in government spending dissipates over time.
As government spending falls, the real interest rate decreases. Workers then gradually increase their consumption. As capital is still being produced, re ‡ected by the persistently higher-than-usual level of investment, the demand for labour is greater than steady state. A greater demand for labour translates into higher real wages, allowing workers to increase consumption spending. Indeed, as the IRFs show, consumption closely follows the dynamics of real wages.
Key Determinants of the Size of the Multiplier
Due to the presence of liquidity constraints, Ricardian equivalence does not hold in the DEFK model. Changes in taxes a¤ect households'behaviour so the value of the multiplier should be sensitive to the …scal rule. We carry out sensitivity analysis on the …scal rule parameter, , which measures how quickly the government increases taxes following bond issues. In the baseline, is set to 0.1 following DEFK to re ‡ect that a slow rise in taxes.
If we increase to 1, the cumulative multiplier on output in the DEFK model reduces to 0.67. This result indicates that the government should delay increasing taxes to ensure e¤ective expansionary policy. We also test our 2008), entrepreneurs and workers are separate entities and the opportunity for entrepreneurs to invest is scarce. In that version of the model, an increase in government borrowing would increase the bond holdings of non-investing entrepreneurs. This would provide investing entrepreneurs with more liquidity when an investment opportunity arrives. Therefore, even without the asset-pooling assumption, the DEFK model still suggests a large multiplier e¤ect on investment.
cludes output growth, which acts as an "automatic stabiliser"to the cyclical position of the economy. Following Leeper et al. (2010), we calibrate the coe¢ cient of output growth in the rule at 0.13 and hold the coe¢ cient of debt constant. 17 The results suggest that the inclusion of the automatic stabiliser in the rule does not a¤ect the value of the …scal multiplier signi…cantly.
The stickiness of prices and wages also plays a role in generating a large …scal multiplier. Rows 8-10 of Table 2 (7), the coe¢ cient of government debt is 0.06 (compared to 0.1 in DEFK's calibration). This suggests that lump-sum taxes in reality are less responsive to changes in the level of government debt. Calibrating the coe¢ cient of government debt at 0.06 gives a larger multiplier but does not change our main conclusions. (2011) suggest that the government spending multiplier is smaller as the persistence of government spending ( G ) increases. We repeat our experiments by increasing G from 0.8 to 0.97, which is the estimate suggested by SW. The cumulative multiplier on output in the DEFK model reduces to 1.04 in this case, whereas the one in the standard model falls to only 0.27. The reason for this result is that as the government spending rise is more persistent, the present value of the associated tax rises also increases, causing larger negative wealth impacts on consumption. The rise in output is therefore much smaller, resulting in a much smaller government spending multiplier.
However, our conclusion that the multiplier is larger in the DEFK model than in the standard model remains unchanged.
We also carry out sensitivity analysis on the monetary policy rule. Instead of (8) 
The Multiplier in Times of Crisis
We now examine the value of the government spending multiplier in times of crisis. In the DEFK model, a liquidity crisis occurs when the value of the resaleability constraint parameter, t ; falls by 60% from steady state. The crisis brings about a liquidity trap. If the government decides to increase spending during a crisis, we assume that it happens in the same period as the arrival of the liquidity shock (t = 1). The cumulative government spending multiplier on output in a crisis is obtained by
, where dY t denotes the change in output due to the combined e¤ects of the liquidity shock and the government spending shock, and dY t denotes the same due to the liquidity shock alone by holding G t constant. The di¤erence between the two measures the output change that is due to …scal stimulus. The multipliers on consumption and investment are calculated in the same way, with Y t being replaced by C t and I t respectively.
Using the DEFK model, we simulate liquidity crises of various expected durations, and compute the cumulative multipliers in response to a government spending shock of 1% of GDP with G = 0:8. 18 This exercise cannot 1 8 The size of the government spending shock is the same as that in the …rst section of Cogan et al. (2010) . Erceg and Linde (2012) …nd that the value of the multiplier can be a¤ected by the size of the …scal stimulus when the liquidity trap is endogenous. The larger is the …scal stimulus, the faster the economy exits the liquidity trap, causing a smaller multiplier. We test our results by increasing the size of the shock to 2% of GDP. We …nd that in normal times, the multipliers are una¤ected; in times of crisis, the multipliers decrease only slightly (by around 0.1 on average). Table 3 : Government spending multipliers on output, consumption and investment in times of crisis in the DEFK model be carried out using the standard model as it does not allow for …nancial frictions. Table 3 shows the cumulative multipliers and the number of periods in which the nominal interest rate falls to zero. Our results suggest that the longer is the liquidity crisis, the longer the liquidity trap is. In addition, the longer is the liquidity trap, the larger the …scal multiplier is.
Duration of Duration of
The DEFK model implies the value of the cumulative multiplier on output ranges between 2.00 and 2.28 in the crisis state, which is much higher than that in normal times.
To determine the cause of a larger multiplier in the crisis state, we report in Figures 3 and 4 the IRFs to a liquidity shock that is expected to last for three years, for the cases with and without government spending expansion. 19 We …rst discuss the case without …scal expansion. The liquidity shock leads to a large decrease in the resaleability of equity, so that entrepreneurs can obtain fewer funds for investment by selling their equity. Figure 3 shows that the fall in investment at t = 1 is as large as 19%. This substantial fall in investment seems to suggest that in the DEFK model, most new investment is …nanced by the sales of entrepreneurs'asset holdings, rather than the issues of new equity. Consumption, output and employment fall by signi…cant amounts upon impact. Both output and consumption fall by around 10%, while labour hours fall by around 15%. 20 Re ‡ecting the ‡ight 1 9 Note that the IRFs are not smooth in this case. Most of the lines bend upwards after 12 quarters from the shock, when the economy is expected to exit from the crisis.
2 0 The fall in economic activity we obtain here is more severe than that suggested by to liquidity, households'bond holdings increase by around 4% and continue to rise in a hump-shaped manner. The nominal interest rate falls to its zero lower bound in response to the liquidity shock and remains zero-bound for ten quarters. In ‡ation decreases by 3.7 percentage points, and because of the zero-bound nominal interest rate, the real interest rate increases by around 2 percentage points.
We now consider the case with government spending expansion. Similar to the case in normal times, the increases in public demand and liquidity lead to an increase in aggregate demand. As a result, in ‡ation falls by less.
Given the zero-bound nominal interest rate, the real interest rate increases by less relative to the case without …scal stimulus, leading to smaller falls in consumption and hence in output. A natural question arises: why is the …scal multiplier larger in the crisis state than in normal times? The reason is that the multiplier e¤ect on consumption is larger at the zero lower bound. To con…rm this, we also report in Table 3 the cumulative multipliers on consumption and investment in crisis times. Indeed, the consumption multiplier is larger than that in normal times and increases substantially as the liquidity trap lengthens, whereas the investment multiplier is similar to that in normal times (see Table 2 ). The positive responses of consumption and investment are consistent with the empirical …ndings reported by Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2012), who show that …scal expansion crowds in consumption and investment during recessions.
To gain an insight into the role that liquidity constraints play in generating large …scal multipliers in crisis times, we also calculate the cumulative government spending multipliers on consumption, investment and output in the zero-bound state using the standard model. Since …nancial frictions are absent in the standard model, we cannot simulate a liquidity crisis in the same way as we do with the DEFK model. Instead, we follow Cogan et al. (2010) to assume that the nominal interest rate in the standard model DEFK. In DEFK, the government carries out quantitative easing in a liquidity crisis by buying private assets and selling government bonds in the open market. Such policy improves liquidity in the economy and helps alleviate the adverse e¤ects of a liquidity shock. In this paper, we focus our study on the e¤ectiveness of …scal policy. Therefore, to simplify our model, we assume that no quantitative easing is carried out in a crisis. Table 4 : Government spending multipliers on output, consumption and investment in the standard model with an imposed zero bound remains constant at its steady-state value for various durations. The results are reported in Table 4 .
The government spending multiplier is still larger in the DEFK model than that in the standard model when the nominal interest rate is constant due to the larger multipliers on both consumption and investment.
In the standard model, the value of the output multiplier is driven mainly by the multiplier on consumption. The investment multiplier is very small.
In addition, as the crisis prolongs, the output multiplier in the standard model increases in a hump-shaped manner, reaching its peak when the zerobound state lasts for one year. This …nding is related to the observation by Christiano et al. (2011) and Woodford (2011) , who suggest that the …scal multiplier is largest if the …scal expansion lasts exactly as long as the zerobound state. Since we assume that government spending evolves according to an AR(1) process with a persistence parameter of 0.8, the majority of the public spending rises in our model occurs within the …rst four quarters after the shock. The government spending multiplier is largest when the zero-bound state lasts for a similar duration. As the liquidity trap lengthens, the …scal stimulus becomes less e¤ective and the value of the multiplier decreases.
A More Realistic Path of Government Spending
Thus far, we have assumed that government spending follows an AR (1) process. While such a process is useful for understanding the possible e¤ects of …scal expansion on the economy, the path of government purchases under this assumption is inconsistent with the actual one implied by the 2009
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA). We plot in Figure 5a the actual increase in government purchases as a share of GDP under the ARRA. While the AR(1) process suggests a large, immediate increase in government spending that dissipates over time, the increase in government purchases under the ARRA is more gradual and reaches its peak only after about a year.
To obtain the path of government purchases under the ARRA, we follow (2010) assume that 60% of intergovernmental transfers result in purchases of goods and services. We then divide the resulting sum by the actual US GDP data. 21 We recalculate the …scal multipliers in crisis times under this more realis- (Table 3) . Therefore, our conclusion that the multiplier is large in a liquidity crisis still holds. We also report in Figure 5b . the impulse-responses of output in a 3-year crisis with and without …scal stimulus. As it is evident from the …gure, without …scal stimulus the fall in output would have been larger by around 1 percentage point at the early stage of the crisis, suggesting that the …scal interventions in the US during the recent …nancial crisis could have saved the economy from a deeper recession.
The Tax Multiplier
What if the government instead chose to stimulate growth by cutting taxes?
In this section, we study the policy multiplier for a temporary cut in taxes with the DEFK model. We assume a lump-sum tax cut of 1% of GDP, which follows an AR(1) process with a persistence of 0.8. The cumulative tax multiplier, de…ned as the expected cumulative increase in output given a one-dollar cumulative cut in taxes, or Improvement in liquidity increases investment, consumption and output.
The reason why the tax multiplier is larger in crisis times than in normal times is the same as that for the case with government spending: an increase in economic activity due to liquidity improvement reduces de ‡ation in a …nancial crisis. As the nominal interest rate is zero-bound, it causes a fall in the real interest rate and hence promotes consumption. To demonstrate the role of the liquidity e¤ect in stimulating output after a tax cut, we also obtain the tax multipliers in the DEFK model by holding the amount of government bonds constant following the tax cut. In this case, the tax multiplier in normal times falls to almost zero, while the one in a 3-year crisis falls to only 0.26.
A comparison of the tax multiplier and the government spending multiplier suggests that government spending expansion is more e¤ective in stimulating output. In the DEFK model, a government spending expansion works by increasing liquidity and creating aggregate demand. A tax cut, on the other hand, resembles a lump-sum transfer to households. While it relaxes households'liquidity constraints, it does not create aggregate demand directly. 22 Nevertheless, the tax multipliers that we obtain using the DEFK model are still much larger than those suggested by the standard model with frictionless …nancial markets.
6 Does the Initial Debt-to-GDP Ratio Matter?
Following DEFK, we calibrate the steady-state government debt-to-GDP ratio at 0.4. In this section, we perform a sensitivity analysis to see how the size of the …scal multiplier depends on the steady-state debt-to-GDP ratio. 23 Figures 6a. and 6b. report the results from our analysis. The results reported in Figures 6a. and 6b. suggest that the size of the multiplier is sensitive to the initial debt-to-GDP ratio. In both normal times and crisis times, the government spending multiplier becomes smaller as the initial debt-to-GDP ratio increases. The intuition of this result is that with a higher debt-to-GDP ratio at steady state, liquidity is more abundant to start with. The improvement of liquidity resulted from a …scal expansion would therefore have smaller stimulative e¤ects on output. During a liquidity crisis, the …scal multiplier without a ZLB is smaller than that with a ZLB, but still larger than that in normal times, implying that both the presence of a ZLB and the deterioration of liquidity contribute to the larger multiplier in a crisis. Our results further suggest that, if the initial debt ratio is low (e.g. 0.2), the ZLB constraint will cause the multiplier to increase by more in a crisis than in the case with a high initial debt ratio. When the initial debt-to-GDP ratio is higher at 0.6, the e¤ect of the ZLB on the size of the multiplier is smaller, probably because of the higher steady-state liquidity in that case. an increase in government spending is larger than that from a tax cut, con…rming our earlier …ndings.
Our results in this section have an important policy implication. Given the …nding that …scal policy becomes less e¤ective with a higher initial debtto-GDP ratio, policymakers may strive to keep the debt-to-GDP ratio low in normal times and use …scal stimulus only in times of crisis in order to maximise the stimulative e¤ects on output.
Summary and Conclusions
In this paper, we have extended the DEFK model by introducing a role for government spending. We use the resulting model to study the e¤ects of …scal policy shocks on the macroeconomy. The DEFK model accounts for liquidity constraints and generates a liquidity-trap crisis when the asset resaleability constraint tightens. Our main …nding is that government spending expansion can be highly e¤ective in an economic environment in which government bonds are liquid and private …nancial assets are only partially liquid. In this model, a bond-…nanced …scal expansion increases the proportion of liquid assets in the private-sector wealth through an increase in the supply of government bonds. An improvement in liquidity has positive e¤ects on private investment, consumption and output, therefore generating a large …scal multiplier. Furthermore, using the DEFK model, we …nd that the tax multiplier is positive but smaller than the government spending multiplier since a lump-sum tax cut improves the private-sector liquidity but does not directly create aggregate demand.
We also study the e¤ectiveness of …scal stimulus in a liquidity crisis. In the DEFK model, a negative shock to liquidity reduces the resaleability of private assets and brings about a liquidity trap. As the multiplier e¤ect on consumption is larger when the nominal interest rate is bound at zero, the …scal multiplier we obtain is even larger than that in normal times. This result is consistent with previous research …ndings which suggest that, relative to the case without …scal expansion, an increase in public demand at the zero lower bound pushes up prices, lowers the real interest rate and stim- in the US, while in Germany and Sweden, the falls were larger at around 5%.
Finally, we …nd that the e¤ectiveness of …scal policy is sensitive to the steady-state debt-to-GDP ratio. Fiscal stimulus becomes less e¤ective as the initial debt-to-GDP ratio increases. This …nding has an important policy implication: Governments may want to contain the public debt ratio in normal times to obtain more e¤ective results from …scal stimulus during deep recessions, when the stimulative e¤ects are most needed. produce which maximises their pro…ts. The …rst-order condition is:
Upon aggregation, the market clears for both labour and capital so that
The capital-labour ratio is:
Capital evolves according to:
and the aggregate production function is:
Capital is owned by households through their private equity holdings:
The pro…ts for intermediate-goods and capital-goods …rms are wholly distributed to households as dividends. Substituting for D t and D K t , (3) becomes:
Finally, the resource constraint of the economy requires that:
